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THE STATUS OF A MALAPPORTIONED LEGISLATURE
By EDWARD N. BEISER*

If the Supreme Court (majority) were logical would they
not have to hold that nearly every law passed and nearly
every appropriation made in the last hundred years by a
... [malapportioned] Congress ... and.

.

. State Legisla-

ture are Unconstitutional and void? And how in logic can
an Unconstitutional Congress or ... State Legislature statutorily provide for valid and Constitutional elections?
John C. Bell, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania,
September 29, 1964.1
If a state's legislative apportionment is declared unconstitutional, is the legality of acts of its legislature impaired? This question was raised in Grills v. Anderson,2 the first case to hold that
an apportionment statute, constitutional when adopted, could become invalid because of changing conditions. Upon the advice
of the Indiana Attorney General, no appeal was taken in Grills
since it was felt that "if the State Supreme Court should concur
in the lower court decision, giving it effect, Indiana would be
without a legislature." 3
The suggestion that a malapportioned legislature is not fully
empowered to act is of immediate political significance. One of the
* B.A., City College of New York; M.A., Ph.D., Princeton University;
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University, Providence,
Rhode Island.
1. Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 473 n.3, 203 A.2d 556, 575 n.3 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
2. Grills v. Anderson, 29 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Sup. Ct. Ind. March 17,
1964).
3.

CoUNcI.

Or STATE

GOVERNMENTS,

LEGISLATIVE

REAPPORTIONMENT

IN THE STATES 22 (1964). The Attorney-General advised Senator Anderson that since the opinion was a declaratory judgment, it was only binding
on those senators who were parties to the suit, and had "no effect on the
other members of the General Assembly ...

."

With respect to Ander-

son's own status, Attorney General Steers assumed "that the General As-

sembly will continue to exercise its Constitutional power . . .to judge the

elections, qualifications and returns of its own members." Were Anderson
to appeal to the state supreme court and lose, "the General Assembly is
no more and we will have a constitutional convention or no government at
all in a short time." Op. IND. ATT'Y GEN., March 17, 1961.
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responses to the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" decision 4 has
been a movement in the state legislatures to call a convention to
amend the United States Constitution in order to reverse the Supreme Court. There has even been speculation that convention
calls adopted by malapportioned legislatures are invalid and need
not be honored. This paper will consider the validity of this assertion.
In the landmark apportionment case of Baker v. Carr' the
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee claimed that were the
Supreme Court to void Tennessee's apportionment laws, it would
seriously disrupt if not altogether destroy the government of that
state.6 His argument was based on Kidd v. McCanless7 a 1956
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court involving a suit for a
declaration that Tennessee's 1901 apportionment statute had become ineffective. The chancery court had ruled that if the statutes were invalidated, the doctrine of de facto status could be
applied to maintain the members of the General Assembly in office.
The Tennessee Supreme Court would not sustain this rationale,
found that "the de facto doctrine cannot be applied," but nevertheless concluded:
The ultimate result of holding this [apportionment] Act
unconstitutional ...

would be to deprive us of the present

. . .Legislature, and the means of electing a new one and
ultimately bring about the destruction of the State itself."
Three of the six Justices who wrote opinions in Baker v. Carr
responded to this argument. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, distinguished Kidd v. McCanless, which "rested on [the]
state law of remedies, that is, the state view of de facto officers
9
" and not on the issues raised in Baker.
The fact that the
United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of Kidd v. McCanless was not significant, because, according to Brennan, "a state
court's inability to grant relief does not bar a federal court's assuming jurisdiction to inquire into alleged deprivation of federal
constitutional rights." 10 Justice Brennan did not speak directly to
the assertion by the Tennessee Supreme Court that the de facto
doctrine could not be applied to maintain a malapportioned legislature.""
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. See briefs of State of Indiana at 7 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 1061, 1062.
7. 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920
(1956).
8. Id. at 283, 292 S.W.2d at 44.
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 235-236 (1962).
10. Id. at 236.
11. Justice Brennan makes passing reference to the problem in connection with Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849). Taney had reasoned that if the Court were to hold that
the charter government of Rhode Island had no legal existence during the
period in question, it would follow that all of its actions would be of no
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Justice Douglas rejected the de facto argument in a footnote
to his concurring opinion. He observed that the "recent ruling by
the Iowa Supreme Court that a legislature, though elected under an
unfair apportionment scheme, is nonetheless a legislature empowered to act ...

12
is plainly correct.'

Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carrquoted
at length from the holding of the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Kidd v. McCanless.13 While, as Justice Brennan contended, a
federal court enforcing the Federal Constitution is not
...
bound by the remedial doctrine of the state courts,
. . . it must consider ...
those state-law effects of its de-

cree which it cannot itself control. A federal court cannot
provide the authority requisite to make a legislature the
proper governing body of the State of Tennessee. And it
cannot be doubted that the striking down of the statute
here challenged .

.

. would deprive the State of all valid

apportionment legislation, and-under the ruling in McCanless-deprive
the State of an effective law-based legis14
lative branch.
The state and lower federal judges who were inundated by a
flood of litigation growing out of Baker v. Carr were given little
guidance as to the impact their decisions would have on the ability
of state legislatures to act. The majority opinion skirted the issue;
Justice Douglas dismissed it as inconsequential; and Justice Frankfurter insisted that it was a significant problem. In fact, the
assertion that a judicial determination of malapportionment would
cripple the legislature was dealt with in a substantial number of
effect and that such a decree had to be avoided. Justice Brennan states
that in Luther v. Borden, "[t]here was, of course, no room for application
of any doctrine of de facto status to uphold prior acts of an officer not
authorized de jure...." 369 U.S. 186, 219 (1962). The application of the
de facto doctrine to Luther v. Borden was Brennan's; Taney in no sense. employed it. This may indicate that Justice Brennan considers it applicable in
apportionment cases. Justice Clark, concurring in Baker, includes Kidd v.
McCanless in a list of cases, which he distinguishes: "Cases resting on
various other considerations not present here, such as . . . Kidd v. McCanless, .

. (adequate state grounds supporting the state judgment) .

.

. are

of course not controlling."
12. 369 U.S. 186, 250 n.5 (1962). Cedar Rapids v. Cox, the Iowa case
relied upon, does not support Justice Douglas' assertion. Responding to
the contention that a municipal annexation statute was unconstitutional because it had been adopted by a nonrepresentative legislature, the Iowa Supreme Court decided that were it to come to such a conclusion, "chaos
would result." 108 N.W.2d 253, 262-263 (Iowa 1961). The court had "no
intention of attempting any such wholesale destruction of our statutory
law," and refused to hold that the Iowa Legislature had been unconstitutionally apportioned. Id. at 263. Since the court did not question the constitutionality of Iowa's legislative apportionment, its decision does not reflect on the powers of an unconstitutionally apportioned body.
13. 369 U.S. 186, 327-330 (1962).
14. Id. at 329-330 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan joined this opin-
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the lower court apportionment decisions. 15 But before examining
these cases, two of the resources which lower court judges could
turn to when dealing with the problem will be discussed.
THE DE FACTO DocTRnE
The doctrine which asserts that, insofar as the public is concerned, one who is not a valid officer in law (de jure) can be more
than a mere usurper, and can perform legally valid acts, has been
traced back to the fifteenth century. 16 The purpose of the doctrine is to protect innocent third parties who must deal with officials and who cannot be expected to investigate the legal title of
those in possession of public office. A widely cited American definition of a de facto officer is found in the Connecticut case of
State v. Carroll:
An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those
of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and
justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests
of the public and third persons, where the duties of the
officer were exercised; First without a known apportionment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people,
without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be; second, under
color of a known and valid apportionment or election, but
where the officer had failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond,
or the like; third, under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or
because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such as ineligibility, want of power, or
defect being unknown to the public; fourth, under color
of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
[unconstitutional] 17
No attempt will be made to trace the development of the de
facto doctrine in the American courts.1 s It is sufficient to note that
the courts have consistently stressed the importance of reputation
-"color of title."' 9 Since reputation is "the touchstone of de facto
status,"20 courts have applied the doctrine only when there was
15.
16.
L. REV.
17.

See p. 563 infra.
The Abbe of Fountaine, 9 Hen. VI 32(3), cited in Note, 63 COLUM.
909 n.1 (1963).
38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 409 (1871), quoted in A. CONSTANTIN.AU,
A TREATISE ON THE DE FACTO DOCTRiNE at 31 (1910) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as A. CONSTANTINEAU].
18. For a good summary of developments since Constantineau's work
appeared, see Note, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 909 (1963).
19. See, e.g., 43 AM. JUR. Public Office § 476 (1942) and cases cited
therein; 67 C.J.S. Officers §§ 136, 140 (1950).
20. Note, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 909, 912 (1963).
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actual possession of the office in question and they have refused to
apply it when a competing claimant held the office. 21 The courts
have consistently held that once color of title ceases, the "mere pos'2
session" of an office "will only constitute the occupant a usurper." 2
It is well established that the validity 23
of acts of de facto officers
is fully equal to those of de jure officers.
One question on which the courts have not agreed is whether
there can be a de facto officer without a de jure office. Writing
for the Supreme Court in 1886, Justice Fields held in Norton v.
Shelby County 2 4 that a de facto officer cannot exist without a

de jure office to fill. His ruling rested on a very traditional conception of the status of an unconstitutional law: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' 5
To Justice Fields, one who purported to fill an "office" created by
such a nullity could have no legal status other than that of pre21. See, e.g., In re Gunn, 32 P. 470 (Kan. 1893), in which the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the de facto doctrine could not sustain the acts of
an alleged House of Representatives when the de jure House was sitting
simultaneously.
22. A. CONSTANTINEAU, note 17 supra, at 39. See, e.g., Book v. State
Office Building Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273, 298 (1958): "The law
seems to be well-settled in Indiana that one who is elected or appointed
to an office under an unconstitutional statute, before it is adjudged to be so,
is an officer de facto and his acts will be held valid in respect to the public ..
" (emphasis added). Similarly, in State ex rel. Anderson v. State
Office Building Comm'n, 185 Kan. 563, 345 P.2d 674 (1959), it was held
that from its creation until a judicial decision of unconstitutionality, the
commission was a de facto body, and its actions were valid. See also State
v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 409 (1871).
23. See A. CONSTANTINEAU, note 17 supra, at 288. One important aspect
of the de facto doctrine which did not come into play in the apportionment
cases is the widely supported holding that the status of an officer cannot be
attacked collaterally. Thus the de facto doctrine will protect an officer
from attack until an information in the nature of quo warranto is brought
by the State. For cases supporting this position, see A. CONSTANTINEAU,
note 17 supra, at 32-33.
A recent opinion by Justice Harlan states that the de facto doctrine does
not prevent the authority of certain judges sitting by designation from
being questioned on appeal, although the issue was not raised below. He
states that this is not a problem when a non frivolous constitutional question is presented. Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). The fact
that Justice Harlan did not discuss the case of Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452
(1899) was taken by a federal circuit court to weaken the traditional view
that the de facto doctrine bars collateral attack on the status of a judge.
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (1962).
A similar conclusion is
reached in Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 364 (1963). Justices Brennan and Stewart joined Justice Harlan's opinion in Glidden. Justice Clark, with the
Chief Justice joining, stated that Ex parte Ward still precludes collateral
attack. 370 U.S. 530, 589 n.5 (1962).
24. 118 U.S. 425 (1886). Field's ruling on this point was obiter dicta.
25. Id. at 442.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

tender. 26
The Supreme Court has never reconsidered this question.
However, many lower courts have declined to follow Norton and
27
the conflict among the authorities appears to be irreconcilable.
While some early commentators supported Justice Fields' position,28 many have dissented. The contention of those who disagree
is that the de facto doctrine is based on reputation-not legal
status-and that an unconstitutional law creating an office may
provide an officer with as substantial a reputation as an unconstitutional act filling a valid office. Thus, it is argued, the same
considerations of public policy which support the acts of the latter
should support those of the former. Just as the citizen cannot be
expected to question the validity of the title of every officer with
whom he comes into contact, he cannot be expected
to explore
29
the constitutionality of the act creating the office.
The view that an unconstitutional statute creating an officebefore it is judged unconstitutional-can provide the necessary
color of title appears to be fully consistent with the principles
underlying the de facto doctrine.3 0 This interpretation would uphold the acts of malapportioned legislatures, prior to a judicial
determination of the invalidity of their apportionment. But it is
difficult to see how the de facto doctrine-as it has developed thus
far-can be used to support a body once a court rules that it
was constituted in a manner which violates the Federal Constitution. Clearly, a legislature's reputation, its "color of title," would
be severely damaged by a judicial decision striking down the statutes under which it was selected. Thus, while the de facto doctrine might guarantee that decisions setting aside legislative apportionments would not become general jail deliveries, it would appear to provide little assistance to judges concerned about the im26. Fields stresses the distinction between the act creating an office,
and the act filling it. If the former is valid, the de facto status rule can be
applied, despite an invalid appointment.
27. See the cases in 43 Am. JUR. Public Officers § 475 (1942). For a
recent example of a federal judge invoking Norton v. Shelby County as
fully controlling in this regard, see Application of Wiechert, 370 F.2d 927,
944 (3d Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
28. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMVIUTATIONS at 898 (7th ed.).
29. See, e.g., Wallach, De Facto Office, 22 POLITICAL S.Q. 460 (1907).
Wallach argues that with one exception, since reversed, in every case the
holding that a de jure office is necessary for the existence of a de facto
officer was obiter dicta. A review of Wallach's article states that the thesis
that a de facto officer can exist without a de jure office "opposes the view
of the textbook writers." Books and Articles, 21 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1907).
Wallach's view is followed in Note, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 909 (1963).
30. "Color of title ceases to exist, however, after a court has passed
unfavorably on the claim of the one actually in possession of the office or
where the defect in title is such that persons dealing with the office must
have had notice of it." 67 C.J.S. Officers § 136 (1950) (citations omitted).
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pact of their apportionment decisions on the authority of subsequent legislatures.
EARLY STATE CASES

While the federal courts did not become seriously involved in
apportionment litigation until after the Supreme Court's decision
in Baker v. Carr, state courts had long dealt with the subject.
They provide a body of case law to which judges concerned with
the impact of apportionment decisions on the status of state legislatures might turn for guidance. 31 The state cases dealing with
the authority of a legislature selected under an unconstitutional
apportionment fall into three broad categories: (1) some holding
that such legislatures could function; (2) others holding that they
could not; and (3) a third group of cases holding that, for a variety
of reasons, courts could not question the ability of the legislature
to act.
The logic of all of the cases upholding the acts of malapportioned legislatures is quite simple: practical necessity requires
that the power of the legislature be maintained. None of these
courts attempted to support its decision with an analysis of the
de facto doctrine, although some invoked it in name. In 1918, the
Florida Supreme Court refused to invalidate taxation legislation,
even though the legislature had failed to comply with a state constitutional requirement that it reapportion itself every ten years:
If this contention is correct, it would upset all the laws
passed subsequent to 1897. The statement of the effect
. . . seems to me sufficient to condemn the contention.
• . . [T]he Legislature passing [the acts in question] was

the Legislature de facto, and its acts are therefore binding.
32

The Illinois Supreme Court employed similar logic ten years later.
a result which would invalidate every
It described as "untenable"
3
statute passed since 1911.

The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma combined several
arguments to support its denial of a writ of prohibition sought to
prevent a trial under a drunk driving statute adopted by an allegedly malapportioned legislature. 4 The court held that the
de facto doctrine applies where the duties of legislative office are
exercised by one in possession of it, under color of title, and it
31. For a survey of state court action see Lerner, The Role of the State
Judiciary in Redistricting and Reapportionment, 18 N.Y.U. INTRA. L.R. 79
(1963).
32. Everglades Drainage League v. Napoleon B. Broward Drainage
District, 253 Fla. 246, 250 (1918). The opinion contains no discussion of the
de facto doctrine and, in this connection, cites no authorities.
33. Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 438, 164 N.E. 665, 666 (1928), followed in Groves v. Board of Education, 367 Ill. 91, 10 N.E.2d 403 (1937).
34. State ex rel. Tayrien v. Doggett, 296 P.2d 185 (Old. Cr. 1956).
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stressed the chaos which would result should it grant the writ:3 5
"On the grounds of public policy and due regard for the administration of justice and an orderly system of laws and government,
the writ. . should be denied."'
In 1960, the Michigan Supreme Court dismissed without discussion the contention that were it to set aside Michigan's constitutional provisions apportioning the legislature, no legislature, either
de jure or de facto, would remain to reapportion the state: "This
argument needs little discussion. There exists at the present time a
legislative body charged by the Constitution with the duty to rearrange senatorial
districts and reapportion the legislature. This
37
it can do."

It is to be noted that this was the only opinion which asserted
that a legislature could function after a judicial determination that
it was malapportioned. But the court did not attempt to explain
its assertion.
Whereas the opinions upholding legislative authority despite
malapportionment were based on practical necessity, the decisions
calling it into question were grounded in the technicalities of the
doctrine of de facto status. An early opinion by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had invoked necessity to support the acts of a malapportioned legislature: "But of course, on grounds of public policy, the acts done and the laws passed by such a [malapportioned]
legislature would be de facto as binding and obligatory as those of
any other legislature." 38 However, dicta in a 1946 opinion by that
court explained that such a holding was inconsistent with the
basic rationale of the de facto doctrine: "Once it is determined
that the present incumbents are not de jure officers, they have no
color of authority and could not serve as de facto officers."3 9
35.

It also relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Ward,

discussed in note 22 supra, to support the proposition that the authority of
the legislature could not be collaterally attacked.
36. 296 P.2d 186 (Old. Cr. 1956), followed in Petition of Boyd, 302
P.2d 494 (Okl. Cr. 1956).
37. Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 at 68-70 (1960). Note
that none of the other cases considered dealt with the ability of the legisla-

ture to act after a judicial determination that it was malapportioned. In a
separate opinion, Justice Black indicated that while he would not grant
judicial relief, were the court to do so, it would have no difficulty in regulating the effect of its decrees so as to allow the legislature to control the
period of transition. Id. at 120, 104 N.W.2d at 125. In the same year, the
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected what it regarded as an argument "in
terrorem," the claim that anarchy would result if it set aside the state's
apportionment, no matter how long it delayed the filing of its mandate,
should the legislature fail to act within that time period. The court refused to assume that the legislature would not do its duty. Asbury Park
Press Inc. v. Wooley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705, 712 (1960).
38. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).
39. State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101, 23 N.W.2d 601,
612 (1946) (emphasis added). The court relied on 46 C.J. par. 367, and
on Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913). A decision fol-
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A number of decisions by the Indiana Supreme Court reached
the same conclusion. Denney v. State ex rel. Basler40 involved an
attempt to require the return to an earlier apportionment statute.
A concurring opinion by Chief Justice Hackney suggested that if
the earlier act should subsequently be declared unconstitutional,
the continued existence of the legislature would be in doubt. He
pointed to authorities holding that de facto status is lost when
want of legal authority becomes notorious. Hackney concluded
that an "essential feature of the [de facto] doctrine would seem
to be that it is considered only with reference to past acts and
not as justifying further acts and the continued right to occupy
the office ....-41 One year later, relying on this opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court refused to invalidate the apportionment act
of 1885-the only apportionment statute which42 remained on the
books-for were it to do so, anarchy would result.
In Kidd v. McCanless, mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee held that the de facto doctrine could only apply prior
to judicial determination of invalidity. 43 Once a court ruled that
Tennessee's apportionment was unconstitutional, the legislature
would cease to exist. Kidd was
followed by the Supreme Courts
44
of Pennsylvania and Oklahoma.
The federal district judge who referred Baker v. Carr to a three
judge court was impressed by the fact that the Supreme Court
had dismissed the appeal in Kidd v. McCanless:
The fair inference is that the Supreme Court concurred in
the finding of the Tennessee Court that equitable relief
should be denied in a case where to grant such relief the
government of the state
would be disrupted or thrown into
45
chaos and confusion.
In every case, the argument that a judicial determination of
the invalidity of apportionment legislation would leave the state
lowing Baker v. Carr which reversed Martin v. Zimmerman insofar as it
rested on Colegrove v. Green did not refer to the de facto doctrine. State
ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
40. 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1895).
41. Id. at 545, 42 N.E. at 942.
42. Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1896). Note the subsequent action of the Indiana Supreme Court in Fruit v. Metropolitan School
District, see note 55 infra.
43. Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (1956), appeal
dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
44. Butcher v. Rice, 397 Pa. 158, 153 A.2d 869, 875 (1959); Brown v.
State Election Board, 369 P.2d 140, 147 (Okla. 1962). The Oklahoma Court's
agreement with Kidd v. McCanless is fully consistent with the holding in
State ex rel. Tayrien v. Doggett, supra at 559, in which the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals refused to set aside a conviction on the grounds that
the legislature passing the statute involved was malapportioned. Tayrien
referred to acts of a legislature prior to a judicial determination of malapportionment. The logic of Kidd is that after such a determination, the
legislature will lack the "color of title" which is necessary under the de
facto doctrine.
45. Baker v. Carr, 175 F. Supp. 649, 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
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without a valid legislature was invoked to justify judicial inaction.
No court struck down legislation passed by a malapportioned
legislature,46or attempted to prevent a legislature from acting in
the future.
In a third group of cases, courts refused to evaluate the authority of malapportioned state legislatures. The leading case is
Sherrill v. O'Brien. The New York Court of Appeals declared the
apportionment statute of 1906 to be in violation of the New York
Constitution after an election had been held in accordance with it,
and responded at considerable length to the argument that once
this declaration of unconstitutionality was made, the legislature
would no longer be a de facto body.4 The court employed two
justifications: (1) the status of a public official could not be
attacked collaterally; and (2) each house of the legislature was
the exclusive judge of its own members. The latter point was developed in great detail:
Whoever either house receives as its legally elected member

. . .

becomes thereby a de jure member of that house,

even though the courts, were such a question triable before
them, might be of a different opinion. It follows therefore,
that not only is the present legislature a valid legislature,
but each member thereof. . . is as to all the world not only
a de facto but a de jure member . .

. and his title to of-

challenged before any tribunal except the
fice cannot 4be
8
house itself.

The holding of Sherrill v. O'Brien that the title of legislators
could not be judicially questioned was followed by the Supreme
Courts of Alabama, 49 Oklahoma, 50 and Wyoming. 51 The North
Carolina Supreme Court adopted an essentially similar position
when it refused to consider an attack on the validity of taxes imposed by an allegedly malapportioned legislature; this was a political question which it could not decide. 52 The Kentucky Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of laches to avoid a challenge
to that state's apportionment legislation: 5 "[I] ndividuals or par46. A decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in 1882 set aside legislation passed by a legislature made up of more members than the state constitution allowed. It was held that the act in question would not have been
adopted without the votes of the extra members. Kansas ex rel. Attorney
General v. Francis, 26 Kan. 724 (1882). This case contains no discussion
of the de facto doctrine.
47. Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907) (concurring
opinion, Chief Judge Cullen). The majority opinion notes its agreement
with Judge Cullen at 188 N.Y. at 211, 81 N.E. at 133.
48. Id. at 214, 215.
49. Bonds v. State Department of Revenue, 254 Ala. 553, 49 So. 2d 289
(1950).
50. Jones v. Freeman, 46 P.2d 564 (Okla. 1943).
51. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Schnitger, 6 Wyo. 479, 95 P. 698 (1908).
52. Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N.C. 89, 3 S.E.2d 316 (1939), appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 516 (1939).
53. Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 61, 102 S.W. 861 (1907).
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ties that have seen the act in operation for years . . . without ...
5 4
protest, will not be heard at a late day to question its validity.
Finally, both state and federal courts in Indiana invoked the
de facto doctrine to prevent collateral
attack on the status of mem55
bers of that state's legislature.
It seems clear that the tactics employed by this third group
of judges are no longer available to courts called upon to decide
apportionment cases. The "political questions" defense has been
eliminated by Baker v. Carr.56 The contention that courts cannot
question a legislature's judgment of its members is contrary to the
development of constitutional law in recent years, and was authoritatively rejected by the Supreme Court in 1966. 51
The cases decided before Baker v. Carr left the judge deciding
an apportionment case two basic choices with respect to the impact of his decision on the legality of the legislature. Judges prepared to rest their decisions on practicality could find precedents to
support the acts of malapportioned legislatures. With one inconclusive exception noted above, however, these cases all involved
actions performed prior to the judicial determination. Judges who
wished to ground their decisions on something more than necessity,
for example, on the doctrine of de facto status, would be forced to
conclude that once a state's apportionment
were voided, its legis5
lature could not continue to function.
THE LOWER COURTS SPEAK:

FROM BAKER TO REYNOLDS

Despite the confidence expressed by Justice Douglas, concurring in Baker v. Carr, that judicial attacks on state apportionment
statutes would not impair the authority of the legislatures elected
in accordance with them,5 9 this argument was pressed by litigants
and dealt with by judges, in a substantial number of the lower
court opinions during the period between Baker and the Supreme Court's next major apportionment decision: Reynolds v.
Sims.

60

Without exception, both state and federal courts refused to
reverse criminal convictions based on statutes adopted by malapportioned legislatures before their apportionment was contested, a
position which is consistent with the interpretation of the doctrine
54.
55.
(1959);
lowing
56.
57.
58.

126 Ky. at 65, 102 S.W. at 863.
Matthews v. Handley, 179 F. Supp. 470 (1959), aff'd, 361 U.S. 127
Noble City School v. School City, 194 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. 1963), folFruit v. Metropolitan School District, 172 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 1961).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Bond v. Floyd, 85 U.S. 116 (1966).
However, as noted above, in every case this finding was obiter

dicta. No court set aside the acts of a malapportioned legislature, or prevented one from acting.
59. 369 U.S. at 250 n.5 (1961).
60.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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of de facto status developed above.6 1 Some of the opinions invoked
the de facto doctrine, and many stressed the chaos which would
follow were they to arrive at any other conclusion. 62 For the most
part, they did not develop a systematic defense of this position; a
statement of the problem provided its own answer:
An acceptance of the contentions of the petitioner would
produce chaos. A presently unascertainable number of...
statutes would be nullified. Property rights would be jeopardized. The marital status of many individuals would
be questionable ....
The prison gates would be thrown
open . . . A recognition63 of the consequences compels rejection of the arguments.
Language used in one of these opinions suggests a problem
which would confront courts asked to apply the de facto doctrine
in a different context:
[O]fficers created by a state constitution are de jure officers and if the officers filling these legislative positions
were elected under an unconstitutional statute . . . they
would nevertheless be de facto officers, at least until such
time as
the statute was judicially declared unconstitu64
tional.
The status of state legislatures after judicial determination that
the statutes or constitutional provisions under which they were
selected violated the Federal Constitution proved more difficult for the lower courts. None of the opinions announced between Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims explicitly held that the
de facto doctrine could be applied after such a judicial determination. " Two federal opinions and one state decision imply this
66
conclusion, though each is less than clear.
61. Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 933 (1964); Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 17 (1963); Horton v. Bomas, 230 F. Supp. 271 (M.D. Tenn. 1964),
aff'd, 335 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1964); Dixie Fireworks Co. v. McArthur, 130
S.E.2d 731 (Ga. 1963); State v. Latham, 375 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1963), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 919 (1963); State v. Bomar, 368 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
62. In Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit argued that the "doctrine of avoidance of
chaos" had "independent equitable significance when technically the de
facto doctrine could not apply." Id. at 448.
63. Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1963). In Dawson,
petitioner raised the interesting point that capital cases such as his should
be distinguished from cases involving general legislation when courts balanced the equities between society's interest in avoiding chaos, and the petitioner's rights. The court did not agree. Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445,
447-448 (6th Cir. 1964).
64. Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445, 447 (6th Cir. 1963) (emphasis
added).
65. Note that the present analysis does not consider cases in which
counsel may have raised this point in argument, but the court did not discuss it in its published opinion.
66. In Stout v. Hendricks, 228 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Ind. 1963), the federal district court stated that it had not seriously considered the suggestion
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Federal and state courts in six states utilized the device of
voiding statutory and constitutional apportionment provisions prospectively so as to avoid a possible threat to the continued existence
of the legislature.67 The usual procedure was to hold specific
provisions of the state constitution or statutes to be "invidiously
discriminatory . . . and . . . prospectively null and void, and inoperative for all future elections to the General Assembly.... 68
The Michigan Supreme Court acted prospectively and, in addition, placed a time limit on the legislature's ability to act as a de
facto body:
Said section two and four [of the state constitution] are
consequently adjudged invalid, prospectively from and
after the date hereof ...
For the purpose of ensuring validity of all legislation
which, being otherwise valid may have been enacted . . .
prior to the date of this judgment; . . . and for the fur-

ther purpose of providing means for the enactment of
valid new legislation during the present legislative session
. .. [including proposed constitutional amendments] . . .
it is adjudged that the presently constituted senate shall,
from this date and until December 31, 1962, but not thereof some of the petitioners that it declare void the election of the members
of the Indiana General Assembly, "upon the vain hope . . . the members
thereby rendered de facto would adopt a just and constitutional reapportionment statute." This language may mean that the court adopts plaintiff's assertion as to the applicability of the de facto doctrine. Language
in Judge Holder's separate opinion supports this interpretation. Id. at 599.
In Hearne v. Smylie, 225 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Idaho 1964), the district
court stated:
Plaintiff's hope of course is that if this court will only declare the
present system of legislative apportionment void ....

then the

present Idaho legislature--at that time ex necessitate only a de
facto body by virtue of our declaration-would presumably do
something about it .
Id. at 655. However, the court's major concern was not with the de facto
status of the legislature, but with judicial power. It refused to "prostitute"
the judicial function by trying to "bluff" the legislature into action. It is
likely that its reference to the de facto doctrine in Hearne's argument does
not imply agreement with it.
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that its decision as to the unconstitutionality of the state's apportionment statutes would not effect the members of the existing legislature, since members elected for fixed terms before the decision were de jure officers for the entire period for which they
were elected. Harris v. Shanahan, 191 Kan. 1, 378 P.2d 157 (1963). The
court did not consider the status of the legislature once the present terms
expired.
67. Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Iowa 1964); Sobel v.
Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885
(W.D. Okla. 1962); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d
656 (1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964). See also Thigpen v. Meyers, Civil No. 5597
(W.D. Mass. May, 1963), cited in NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, 5 COURT
DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1963).
68. Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689, 694 (S.D. Iowa 1964).
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after, function as de facto officers for all valid purposes.6 9
The court did not explain the basis of its time limit on the de facto
existence of the Michigan Senate.
In the wake of several recent Supreme Court decisions refusing to apply constitutional rulings retroactively,7 0 and of the
suggestion that the British House of Lords-long the "bastion of
rigid stare decisis"-may be prepared to overrule its previous decisions with prospective application only,7 the utilization of prospective invalidation by these courts does not appear exceptional.
However, it must be remembered that when these opinions were
drafted, this was not the case. Writing in 1958, Professors Hart
and Sacks asserted that
[c]ontrary to what has sometimes been supposed, the Supreme Court of the United States seems never to have
sanctioned the practice of prospective
overruling in the
72
judicial elaboration of federal law.

An extremely detailed discussion of prospective overruling published in the Yale Law Journal in 1962 began with Justice Holmes'
assertion, "Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for
near a thousand years," and claimed that "the statement remains a
fair description of one of the central principles in our received learning on the common law. '7 3 After a painstaking examination of the
precedents, the author concluded that the "use of prospective
overruling by a federal court should be deemed prohibited by the
case and controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. '7 4 The fact that these state and federal judges invalidated
legislative apportionment provisions prospectively must be viewed
as a significant indication of their concern that their decisions
would leave the states without valid legislatures.
Several of the opinions employing prospective invalidation
educed bitter dissents. Federal District Judge Ross Rizley was
unable to find any decision of any court which says that
by condoning a void and illegal statute . . . you breathe
69.

Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. at 187, 116 N.W.2d at 356-357 (emphasis

added).
70. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
71. See Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of
Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797, 802 (1967).
72. H. HART, JR. AND A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 630 (1958).

BASIC PROBLEMS

73. Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). Similar conclusions were
reached by other writers: "[T]he body of existing Supreme Court precedent had certainly not previously been conceived of as establishing a broad
judicial power of prospective limitation." Mishkin, Forward: The High
Court, The Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 56, 59 (1965); "Prior to the 1964 Supreme Court Term, decisions promulgating new constitutional rules were applied retroactively as a matter
of course to final convictions." Comment, 64 MICH. L. REv. 832 (1966).
74. Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 951 (1962).
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legality into the statute and give a right to those who operate under it ... [W]here a court, as we did ...

declares

a statute creating public offices null and void, the statute
is null and void ab initio....

The offices of the legisla-

ture were determined null and void.

They no longer ex-

ist. ....7.

Unlike others making this argument, Judge Rizley did not counsel
judicial restraint; the malapportioned legislature's inability to act
legally justified immediate judicial intervention.
Dissenting state judges in the Maryland and Michigan cases
urged restraint. Judge Henderson rejected the doctrine of prospective invalidation, claiming that it repudiated the common law
doctrine that "judges do not make law but discover it.'

'

An

adjudication that the Maryland Legislature is constituted in violation of the Constitution would destroy its power to act: "even
to
7
enact a proposed amendment to the Maryland Constitution.
Chief Justice Carr, writing for three of the seven members of
the Michigan Supreme Court, reached a similar conclusion:
If the amendment is adjudged invalid, the senatorial districts created thereby become nonexistent, and for obvious
reasons the members of the senate elected from said
districts cannot be deemed de facto officers for any purpose. There cannot be de facto officers unless there is a
de jure office.78
If the apportionment provisions of the state constitution are set
aside, "then the State of Michigan will necessarily be left without
a State Senate and hence, without a legislature."7 9
Several courts judged the danger that their action might leave
a state without a valid legislature to be sufficiently great so as to
require more substantial measures than prospective invalidation.
The federal district court to which Baker v. Carr was remanded
noted that under Tennessee law, a legislature whose authority had
been questioned by a judicial decision could not act in "good
faith," and that therefore its actions could not be supported by
the de facto doctrine. 0 It was not certain that a federal court
was bound to accept the state court's view of the doctrine, but
the possibility convinced the three federal judges that, although
they had found Tennessee's apportionment to be unconstitutional,"'
75. Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 900, 902 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
76. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. at 487, 180 A.2d at 674.
77. Id.
78. Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. at 194, 116 N.W.2d at 360.
79. Id. at 195, 116 N.W.2d at 361. Carr denounced the action of his
colleagues as creating a legislature by "fiat of the majority of the members
of this Court .. " Id. at 198, 116 N.W.2d at 364.
80. Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 350 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). The
court relied on Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956),
appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
81. 206 F. Supp. at 348.
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their proper course of action was to "expressly withhold final judgment on all issues, including a declaration of invalidity, . . . until

the General Assembly has acted at its 1963 session." 82 The "express sanction of the court" would allow the General Assembly to
act in "good faith."
The federal courts in Delaware and Iowa were not confronted
by state doctrine comparable to that of Kidd v. McCanless, yet both
followed the example of the Tennessee court. Because a judgment
voiding Delaware's apportionment prior to legislative action "might
[leave] no de jure General Assembly that could effect a valid constitutional amendment, call validly for a Constitutional Convention, or even pass a valid question . . .

,"

the district court at first

refused to reach the merits of the case. Later, despite its finding
of unconstitutionality, it delayed enforcement to allow the legislature to act: 82 "The situation obviously [is] fraught with great
danger to the people of this State. '84 The judges spelled out the
exact nature of the "danger":
We wish to make it clear,

. .

. that there is doubt as to

the length of continuance of the de facto existence of the
122nd General Assembly beyond the present terms of its
members ....

We point out, for example that if a bond

issue had to be authorized by the present General Assembly in, say February, 1965 on the theory of the de facto
continuing powers of its members, financial authorities
might look with some hesitancy upon the sale of securities
so authorized 8
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
which was ultimately to adopt the technique of prospective invalidation, initially acted in a similar manner:
Inasmuch as a legislative branch of state government is absolutely essential to carry out and operate state government, including any obligation which may exist with respect to apportionment, nothing should be done at this
time which carries any reflection upon the legality of
the legislative branch of government. 86
For this reason, the court would not set aside apportionment legislation which it held to be "invidiously discriminatory and in viola87
tion of the ... Fourteenth Amendment."

82. Id. at 349.
83. Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963); Sincock v.
Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D.Del. 1962).
84. Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D.Del. 1962).
85. Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169, 191 (D.Del. 1961) (emphasis
added). At this point the court stated: "We are aware of the statements
respecting the issue in Scholle v. Hare, 116 N.W.2d 350, 357." Id. at 191.
86. Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492, 505 (S.D. Iowa 1963).
87. Id. at 501. Judge McMannus, dissenting, would have declared
that the Iowa General Assembly, "as presently constituted, should from
this date [May 3, 1963] and until December 31, 1963, but not thereafter,
function as a de facto body for all valid purposes and for the further pur-
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Only one majority opinion actually declared that were a state's
apportionment legislation voided, the legislature would cease to
exist. The Oklahoma Legislature had included a non-severability clause in its 1963 reapportionment act. Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court found certain provisions of the act to be contrary to
the state constitution, "[i] f the non-severability clause is effective,
...then there exists no legislative apportionment of the Senate."8 s
The court refused to allow the non-severability clause to go into
effect, because to do so would eliminate entirely Oklahoma's apportionment legislation, and this would destroy the legislature:
This Court may never be authorized to act, or fail to act
so as to put an end to the existence of any coordinate
branch of state government ....

A coordinate branch of

the government may never be permitted to destroy itself.8 9
Dissenting federal judges in Connecticut and Georgia expressed the
fear that the actions requested of their courts might leave the
states without legislatures.9
As noted above, similar views were
expressed by dissenting judges in Oklahoma and Michigan who resisted prospective invalidation by their courts. 91
Two lower court opinions announced between Baker v. Carr
and Reynolds v. Sims specifically dealt with the ability of a malapportioned legislature to call a constitutional convention. The
Tennessee case of West v. Carr 92 involved a suit to declare unconstitutional an act submitting to the voters the question of whether
to call a convention to consider legislative apportionment and other
enumerated matters. The members of the convention, were it
called, would be selected in the existing legislative districts, but
its proposals would be subject to popular approval on a state wide
basis.
pose of providing means for the enactment of implementing apportionment

legislation under the Iowa Constitution ....

Id. at 510. McMannus relied

on Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 250
(1962) and the authorities cited there by Douglas. He also invoked Scholle

v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), perhaps leading to the
majority's explicit rejection of this decision. See note 85 supra.
88. Davis v. McCarty, 388 P.2d 480, 488 (Okla. 1964).
89. Id. at 488.
90. Anderson, J., dissenting in part in Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229
F. Supp. 754 (D.C. Conn. 1964), aff'd, 378 U.S. 562 (1964), said: "A complete refusal by an illegally constituted legislature to take the necessary
action might conceivably result in the State of Connecticut having no Legislative Branch in its government." Id. at 784.
Tuttle, J., dissenting in Toombs v. Fortson, Civil No. 7883 (N.D. Ga.
July 13, 1963), said: ". . . I am of the view that unless the constitutional
defects are remedied by the time the new Legislature takes office in
January, Georgia will have no legally constituted Legislature. See also
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, 3 COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962), wherein the Toombs opinion is reported.
91. See text at notes 75 and 79 supra.
92. 212 Tenn. 367, 370 S.W.2d 469 (1963), cert. denied, 378 U.S. 557

(1964).
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The chancellor held that Tennessee's legislative apportionment
act had been invalidated by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,
and that the selection of convention delegates from the districts it
created would violate the Federal Constitution. The Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed the chancellor. It did not understand the
Supreme Court to have issued a final judgment on the merits of
Baker v. Carr 5 In addition, it distinguished Baker from the case
at hand. Unlike a legislature, a constitutional convention can only
make suggestions to the electorate. Therefore, plaintiffs could
demonstrate no personal harm resulting from the use of the invalidated districts in the selection of convention members. The
court did not consider the possibility that a convention selected
from validly apportioned legislative districts might propose items
but which would not
to the voters which were in plaintiff's interest,
94
be proposed by a malapportioned convention.
A dissenting federal district judge invoked West v. Carr, then
pending before the Supreme Court, in support of his assertion that
"there may well be a serious question as to whether the constitutional convention [which wrote the Michigan Constitution of 1963]
was called in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
144 delegates . . .were allocated to and elected from the . . . districts . . .[of the old apportionment]."95

On June 22, 1964, the Supreme Court declined to speak directly to the question raised in West v. Carr; it dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction and, treating the papers as a petition for certiorari,refused to grant the writ.9 6
On the eve of the Supreme Court's 1964 decision which invalidated the legislatures of most states, no court was prepared to
leave a state with a legislative vacuum; yet to a significant number
of judges, both state and federal, the problem clearly was not a
trivial one. They were apprehensive about the potentially destructive impact of their apportionment decisions.
1964 DE cISIONs
On June 15, 1964, the Supreme Court in a series of six interconnected cases97 announced that the Equal Protection Clause of
93. Id. at 375, 370 S.W.2d at 472.
94. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals developed this
thought as follows: "Furthermore, the mere right to approve or disapprove
a proposed constitution does not afford to the general public a voice in the
formulation thereof. The people are entitled to equal representation when
it is determined what that solemn document shall contain, not merely to
a bare right of veto. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (W.
Va. 1965).
95. Marshall v. Hare, 227 F. Supp. 989, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
96. 378 U.S. 557 (1964).
97. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 670 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland
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the Fourteenth Amendment requires that both houses of state
legislatures be apportioned on the basis of population. Although
in two of the six cases, lower courts had explicitly questioned the
ability of an unconstitutionally apportioned legislature to act, the
Justices made only passing mention of this matter. 8
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Maryland Committee v.
Tawes 99 notes that while remanding the case, the Maryland Court
of Appeals had instructed the lower court to declare that the legislature had the power, if called into special session, to enact reapportionment legislation. Warren later states that with "the Maryland constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment
hereby held unconstitutional, the Maryland Legislature presumably has the inherent power to enact at least temporary reapportionment legislation pending adoption of state constitutional provisions .... 10o But the Chief Justice makes no mention of the
language in the Maryland opinion which referred to prospective invalidation, and it is probable that by the "inherent power" of the
legislature he means that even in the absence of specific state
constitutional provisions giving it the power to do so, an otherwise valid legislature has the power to reapportion. 101
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in the New York and Colorado 10 2 cases criticizes the Court's "draconian pronouncement,
which makes unconstitutional the legislatures of most of the 50
states .... ,,103 He does not, however, discuss the implications
which might be drawn from this legislative unconstitutionality.
Justice Harlan dissenting in Reynolds v. Sims 0 4 observed that

the authority of acts of the legislature might be questioned were a
state's apportionment voided. Other than observing that this issue
was raised "[b]y way of prodding, presumably," Harlan does not
comment on its merits.
But while the Court did not explicitly discuss the challenges
to the ability of a malapportioned legislature to act, the Chief
Justice repeatedly asserted, without provoking dissent, that reCommittee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).

98.

The two cases involved the Maryland and Delaware legislatures.

99.
100.
101.

377 U.S. 656, 662 (1964).
Id. at 675.
See footnote 23 in the opinion by Chief Justice Warren which

refers the reader to the ruling of the Maryland Court that the legislature
would have the power to enact reapportionment legislation "because the
powers of the General Assembly of Maryland are plenary, except as limited by constitutional provisions."

Id. at 676.

102. 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
this opinion.

Justice Clark joined in

103. Id. at 746.
104. 377 U.S. 618 (1964). This is given as one of a list of examples of
inappropriate judicial attempts to pressure legislatures, growing out of

what Harlan regards as the Court's unfortunate intrusion into the political
thicket.
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apportionment was a matter for the legislature. Courts had properly decided-and in the future might properly decide-to withhold relief if legislative action seemed appropriate. 1° The only
restriction imposed by the Supreme Court was that legislative relief must be promptly forthcoming. Clearly, the Court assumed
without discussion that malapportioned legislatures had the power
to pass valid reapportionment legislation.
THE LowER COURTS AFTER REYNOLDS

A considerable body of judicial opinion subsequent to the Supreme Court's 1964 decisions held that unconstitutionally apportioned legislatures could enact valid legislation. As one would expect, the few attempts to set aside criminal convictions based on
statutes adopted by malapportioned legislatures prior to the finding
of malapportionment were totally without success. 10 6 In addition,
many courts understood the 1964 decisions to have settled the
question in so far as future legislative action was concerned. As
Judge Traynor put it:
There is no merit in the contention that because the
present apportionment of the Senate and Assembly is invalid, the Legislature is not empowered to act. By repeatedly encouraging invalidly apportioned state legislatures to reapportion themselves, the United States Supreme
Court has clearly recognized that until a new legislature
0 7
is elected, the existing legislature may validly legislate.
A few courts invoked the de facto doctrine to uphold the acts
of legislatures subsequent to their findings of malapportionment. 08
In none of these cases did the court attempt to explain how the
doctrine was applicable. 1 9 Still other courts-without reference
105. See, e.g., 377 U.S. at 586, 655, 684, 693.
106. Horton v. Bomar, 335 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1964); Palm Beach
County v. Green, 179 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1965); State v. Clark, 217 N.E.2d 588
(Ind. 1966); State ex rel. Fralix v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1964),
wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court said that its previous decision in
Kidd v. McCanless did not prevent the utilization of the de facto doctrine
to support acts of the legislature passed prior to a determination of unconstitutionality.
107. Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270, 405 P.2d 132, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308.
See also, Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. Md. 1964);
Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8 (D.C. Minn. 1964); Mann v. Davis, 238
F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1964), afj'd, 379 U.S. 694 (1965); Hill v. Huger, 171
So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1965); People v. Kerner, 32 Ill. 2d 212, 205 N.E.2d 33 (1965);
People v. O'Neill, 333 Ill. 2d 184, 210 N.E.2d 526 (1965).
108. Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.C.N.D. 1964); see also, Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. D.C. 1967); Long v. Avery, 251 F. Supp.
541, 557 (D. Kan. 1966); League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 232
F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Neb. 1964); Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F. Supp. 699 (W.D.
Mo. 1964).
109. In the Missouri and North Dakota cases, defendants petitioned the
courts to define de facto status and to inform them as to whether special
legislative sessions might be called. The courts declined to do so on the
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to either the Supreme Court's apportionment decisions or the
de facto doctrine-held that as a practical matter, the malapportioned legislatures must be allowed to act. Such phrases as
"sheer necessity" and "orderly operation of government" were
common inthese opinions.11 0
By February, 1966, even a persistent judicial critic admitted
that despite his strong reluctance to do so, he was forced to bow
to the pressure of opinions which held that a malapportioned legislature could function:
I am duty bound, then, by the doctrine of stare decisis to
follow the decisions of the Supreme Court ....

So I must

assume, although I am unable to comprehend how, an
"unconstitutional" state legislature can possess the power
to enact a constitutional scheme of reapportionment. ....
Yet, even after Reynolds v. Sims, many judges were not convinced that the acts of a malapportioned legislature are completely
legitimate. A small group of judges continued to employ the device of prospective invalidation as it had been used prior to
Reynolds. The Supreme Court of Hawaii indicated that to "enter
an adjudication of present invalidity and at the same time recognize the continued powers of the legislators heretofore elected
would be inconsistent.1' 12 Its decree would operate "in futuro.' 13
In a similar manner, federal district courts sitting in Iowa and Mississippi rendered their decisions prospectively. 1 4 And the federal
district court which set aside North Dakota's legislative apportionment stayed its decree until after the forthcoming 1964 election,
"and for a reasonable time after the commencement of the 1965
Legislative Assembly in order to afford such Assembly a reasonable and adequate opportunity to enact such apportionment legisla11
t i o n . . . .. ,,
Of much greater interest are a group of opinions in which
.

grounds that this would constitute an advisory opinion. Paulson v. Meier,

246 F. Supp. 36 (D.C.N.D. 1965); Jonas v. Hearnes, 246 F. Supp. 70 (W.D.
Mo. 1965).
110. Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877 (M.D.N.C. 1965); Schaefer v.
Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Wyo. 1965) ([T]he State of Wyoming must
have a legislature at all times.... ); Artmentrout v. Schooler, 409 S.W.2d
138 (Mo. 1966); Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713 (1964); Bailey
v. Jonas, 81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385 (1966); Tomblin v. Biven, 150 W. Va.
733, 149 S.E.2d 284 (1966). In an extensive series of cases, the New York
Supreme Court voided the apportionments of various local governmental
units, but allowed them to continue to function. See, e.g., Michl v. Shanklin, 50 Misc. 2d 460, 270 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1966); Goldstein v. Rockefeller, 45
Misc. 2d 778, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1965).
111. Senior District Judge William Mathes, dissenting in Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F. Supp. 537, 548 (D.C. Ariz. 1966).
112. Guntert v. Richardson, 394 P.2d 444 (Hawaii 1964).
113. Id. at 444.
114. Connor v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D. Miss. 1966); Davis
v. Cameron, 238 F. Supp. 462, 466 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
115. Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183, 190 (W.D. Okla. 1964).
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courts allowed malapportioned legislatures to reapportion themselves, but in which the courts imposed limitations on the ability
of these bodies to exercise full legislative power. In seven states,
federal courts abridged the terms of legislators whom they allowed
to continue to function, either by setting terminal dates beyond
which they might not serve, or by stipulating that their election
under statutes previously held unconstitutional would be for a specific, abbreviated period.1 16
In eight states, federal courts restricted the actions which malapportioned legislatures might take. In three cases they stipulated
that the legislature would not have the power to act on any other
subject until after it had adopted constitutional reapportionment
legislation. As the district court to which the Supreme Court remanded the Virginia apportionment case put it:
We think, also, that after the [malapportioned] 1963 Assembly has enacted a constitutionally valid reapportionment statute-but not before then-and during the interval between its adoption and the commencement of
the terms of the Senators and Delegates chosen in the
1965 election .

.

. the Assembly should not be restrained

from considering and passing
such legislation as it con117
siders necessary and proper.
Federal courts in Hawaii and Kansas used similar language.118 New
York was permitted to elect a legislature in November, 1964, for
a one year term using the existing unconstitutional apportionment
statutes, providing that the legislature so elected produced a valid
apportionment no later than April 1, 1965.119 A federal district
court in Connecticut enjoined that state's legislature from "doing
any act or taking any steps in furtherance of the legislative functions . . .

,"

and then stayed execution of its ban subject to legis-

lative compliance with a detailed schedule of actions. 120

116. Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Wyo. 1965) (terms
of half of the members of the Wyoming Senate were shortened by two
years), aff'd, 383 U.S. 269 (1966); Holt v. Richardson, 238 F. Supp. 468, 479
(D.C. Hawaii 1965) (Hawaii Senators allowed to remain in office except
that all seats would become vacant on election day, 1966); WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (selection of New York legislators under constitutional statute allowed, but terms limited to one year),
aff'd sub. nom., Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965); Toombs v.
Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1965) (terms of members of the Georgia
legislature terminated at a fixed date, though they would otherwise have
continued), aff'd, 384 U.S. 210 (1965); Herweg v. Thirty Ninth Legislative
Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (1965) (all legislative seats vacated on a specific
date); Reynolds v. State Election Board, 233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla.
1964) (terms of some Oklahoma senators shortened by two years); Mann
v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 1964) (terms of Virginia senators
terminated two years early), aff'd, 379 U.S. 694 (1965).
117. Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 1964).
118. Holt v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 468, 479 (D.C. Hawaii 1965);
Long v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 541, 558 (D.C.N.D. 1964).
119. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
120. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 237 F. Supp. 302 (D.C. Conn. 1965).
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Two cases in which federal district courts limited the ability
of malapportioned legislatures to act are particularly noteworthy
because of subsequent Supreme Court action. In Buckley v.
Hoff, 1" 1 the district court allowed the 1964 election for the Vermont Legislature to be conducted under the existing, unconstitutional apportionment, but provided that the members so elected
would be "limited to the devising of a constitutional method of
reapportionment and redistricting," and that their terms would be
limited to three months. On appeal, all parties and intervenors
asked the Supreme Court to modify this order according to a
stipulation which provided a detailed schedule for legislative action, and allowed the governor to convene a special session of the
legislature should an emergency occur not related to reapportionment. The Supreme Court
granted the request, thus limiting
122
the legislature's ability to act.
The district court which held that the Georgia legislature was
malapportioned allowed the 1964 election to be held under existing
statutes, but restricted the power of the legislature so chosen in
two ways: (1) it enjoined the legislature from submitting a new
constitution to the electorate for adoption until it was reapportioned; and (2) except for reapportionment legislation, it limited
the 1965 House to such matters as could normally come before the
regular 1965 45-day session. 12 3 While the case was being appealed,
the district court removed the latter restriction at the request of
all parties. The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Fortson
v. Toombs"24-speaking only to the prohibition on the submission
of a new constitution to the voters by the malapportioned legislature-noted that the situation had changed since the 1964 election,
"as both the Senate and the House have new members, and appellees, for whose benefit the challenged provision was added,...
suggest the [limitation] in question be vacated as moot.' ' 12

5

The

Supreme Court vacated that part of the decree limiting the legislature's power, and remanded to the district court, "to whom we
give a wide range in moulding a decree .

.

. for reconsideration of

Once the court approved the plan adopted by the legislature, it "amended
the judgment to terminate the restraint on the carrying on of the legislative functions ......
Id. at 313.
121. 234 F. Supp. 191, 200 (D.C. Vt. 1964).
122. Parsons v. Buckley, 379 U.S. 359 (1965). The Vermont Supreme
Court, in a related action, spoke of the legislature elected in 1964 as one
which "served only at the will of the Federal judiciary ....
The 1965
legislature owed its continued existence to federal sovereignty, and drew
its de jure powers from that source." For this reason, it was able to go
beyond the Vermont Constitution's grant of authority when reapportioning
the state. Smith v. Buraczynski, 125 Vt. 310, 214 A.2d 826 (1965).
123. Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). For a full
text of the district court's order and its amendment thereof, see Fortson v.
Toombs, 379 U.S. 639 (1965) (appendices to dissenting opinion, Goldberg, J).
124. 379 U.S. 621 (1965).
125. Id. at 622.
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the desirability and need for the on-going injunction in light of
the results of the 1964 election and representations of appellees."' 26
Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Stewart joined, strongly
objected to the implied approval of the limitations imposed on the
legislature by the district court:
[I]t seems scarcely open to serious doubt that so long as
the federal courts allow this Georgia Legislature to sit, it
must be regarded as the de facto legislature of the State,
legislative powers accorded
possessing the full
12 7 panoply of
by Georgia law.
In only one case did a court specifically consider the power of
malapportioned state legislature to propose an amendment to the
United States Constitution, intended to modify the Supreme Court's
"one man, one vote" decision. In an opinion approving Utah's new
legislative apportionment, the federal district court provided that
until members selected from the new districts took office, the legislature could not propose such a federal constitutional amendment:
And particularly nothing we do today is to be interpreted
as authorizing legislative action with respect to any amendment which may be proposed to the Constitution of the
United States to permit apportionment including factors
other than population. .

.

.

Having regard to the long

period of time during which all efforts to obtain a constitutionally apportioned legislature have been frustrated in
this State, and to the further unfortunate delay until January, 1967 before we shall have a constitutionally apportioned Legislature, well known general principles of equity
require that the Legislature not consider or vote upon any
proposal to amend the Constitution of the United States
on the subject of legislative apportionment....128
Clearly, despite Judge Traynor's assertion that there is "no
merit in the contention,1' 29 a significant number of judges felt that
a legislature based on an unconstitutional apportionment is not a
fully valid legislature.
THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS

The hotly contested 1966 gubernatorial election in Georgia led
the Supreme Court to define the powers of a malapportioned legislature. Since neither Howard Calloway nor Lester Maddox received a majority of the votes cast, the Georgia Constitution required that the governor be selected by the legislature. One of the
bases of the legal attack brought against this procedure was that
126.
127.
128.
added).
129.

Id.
Id. at 626.
Petuskey v. Rampton, 243 F. Supp. 365 (D.C. Utah 1965) (emphasis
See text at note 107 supra.
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"it would permit the malapportioned General Assembly of Georgia to elect a Governor ....

Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Black asserted
that the legislature was empowered to act.131 In Toombs v. Fortson, the Court had allowed the Georgia Assembly to continue to
function until May 1, 1968. "Consequently, the Georgia Assembly
is not disqualified to elect a Governor as required by ... the

State's Constitution." The majority had apparently adopted Justice Harlan's argument: if a malapportioned legislature is allowed
to function, it must be allowed to function for all purposes.
In a strong dissent joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas, Justice Fortas admitted that the Court had "declined to
deprive a malapportioned legislature of its de facto status as a legislature."'12 But, he continued, had the Court foreseen that this
would have allowed the malapportioned Georgia legislature to
overrule a plurality of the voters, it most probably would have
enumerated this power as an "exception," forbidden to the legislature, which "this Court has held, functions only by judicial sufferance despite its constitutional infirmity."'1 3 Fortas argued
persuasively that it was inconsistent for the Court to allow the
Georgia Legislature to select the governor, when one year earlier
it had upheld a district court decision preventing the same legislature from submitting a new constitution to the electorate.
Justice Fortas' opinion does not make known how he would decide which functions malapportioned legislatures may perform.
Justice Black's opinion indicates that a majority of the Court has
no intention of being called upon to make sure distinctions. With
apologies to Gertrude Stein: a legislature, is a legislature, is a
legislature.
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to see how the decision in Fortson v. Morris can
be squared with the suggestion that attempts to reverse Reynolds
v. Sims are invalid if the legislatures calling for a constitutional
convention were themselves malapportioned. It must be assumed
that should this question ever come before them, the Justices
would uphold the convention calls.
The significance of this line of cases extends beyond this prediction of what the courts will do in a specific situation. It is clear
130. Morris v. Fortson, 262 F. Supp. 93, 94 (N.D. Ga. 1966). The district court did not respond to this argument, but held that the Equal
Protection Clause, as interpreted in Gray v. Sanders, set aside the Georgia
procedure.
131. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).

132. Id. at 240. Since Fortas' dissent differs in several respects with
Justice Douglas' (which Fortas had joined) the fact that Fortas lost Justice
Brennan's dissenting vote does not necessarily indicate that Brennan agrees
with Black on this point.
133. Id. at 240.
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that the possibility that judicial decisions invalidating legislative
apportionments might impair the ability of state legislatures to
act never seriously troubled the Justices of the Supreme Court,
despite the extensive attention which it received in the lower courts.
The discussions of the doctrine of de facto status and the concern
with the logical extension of their decisions which are found in

many lower court opinions, are absent from those of the Supreme
Court.
Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that at least some lower
court judges conceive of their roles in different terms than do the
members of the Supreme Court. If, as was suggested above, the
de facto doctrine as it had developed in case law could not be
applied to support the acts of legislatures once they were found to
be unconstitutionally apportioned, what of it? Obviously, a situation-oriented court need not concern itself overly much with this
rather technical point. Clearly, no court would allow a state's legislature to cease to exist. What difference would it make whether
a rationale were presented for this necessary result?
The decisions upholding the power of malapportioned legislatures to act must be justified in terms of necessity; they are inconsistent with the traditional model of judges discovering and applying pre-existing "law." This study suggests that the lower court
judges endorse this model and are rule oriented rather than situation oriented to a greater extent than the Justices of the Supreme
Court. 13 4

It is intriguing to ask-and worthy of further study to

determine-whether this difference in role perception has been
true of lower court and Supreme Court judges in the past, or
whether it is a function of tendencies peculiar to the present
Court. I suggest that much of the resistance to decisions of the
Warren Court by segments of the state and lower federal judiciaries
may be fruitfully understood in terms of differences in role perception. The apportionment cases indicate that the divisions with135
in the Supreme Court itself can be explained in these terms.
Certainly the vehement attacks on Justice Fortas by Senators op134. This is not to say that many lower court judges are not situation
oriented; obviously there is much overlap. It may be that the lower court
judges were simply more concerned with keeping up the appearance of
adhering to the traditional model than the Justices of the Supreme Court.
The stance taken may, of course, have been a convenient rationalization
of their substantive preferences. If, as suggested, "judicial role perception"
is a useful concept for the analysis of judicial behavior, we will want to
develop other methods of studying it. Direct interviews with a substantial
number of judges would be a more desirable procedure than case analysis. For an indication that this is a real possibility see Becker, Surveys and
Judiciaries,or Who's Afraid of the Purple Curtain, 1 LAW & Soc. REV. 133
(1966).
135. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr,
where he demonstrates how the "premises that underlie this decision" differ
from those which he and Justice Frankfurter share. 369 U.S. at 339.
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posed to his confirmation as Chief Justice were manifestations of
the same phenomenon.
It is hardly novel to assert that judges do more than discover
and apply "the law"-that the traditional model does not adequately describe the judicial function. And yet there is something significantly original about Justice Fortas' criticism of the
majority opinion in Fortson v. Morris: Fortas chides his breathren
for their failure to admit that had they foreseen the turn events
would take, they would have produced a different decision in their
earlier treatment of the Georgia case. Forsaking the mystery of
the "purple curtain," he would have the Court openly refuse to
reach an undesirable result. It is not simply that Justice Fortas is
not complying with the traditional model of judicial behavior; he
does not feel obligated to publicly pretend that he is. Fortas disregards the cautionary advice often given to the Court: "It would
be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in the name of sound
scholarship, were to disavow publicly the myth upon' 13 which
its
7
power rests."'' 3 6 He has abandoned the "cult of the robe.'
Whether the public recognition by the Justices of the accuracy of the claims of the legal realists is desirable, each reader
must determine for himself. The conclusion here suggested is that
the movement in this direction by the Supreme Court tends to differentiate it from some lower courts, and that this difference in
role perception has significant impact upon the response of lower
court judges to Supreme Court decisions.

136.

M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 27

(1964).

137. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949). For a discussion of legal
realism and selected works, see G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1964).
Other examples of Justice Fortas' abandonment of the "cult of the
robe" are the publication of his book Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience, (1968), a work clearly intended to mold public opinion, and his
willingness to teach a seminar at the American University Law School during the summer of 1968.

